|
This study of the administrative context,
content, and reception of these posters allows us to make a number
of conclusions on the issue of World War II propaganda. These
relate to the way that the government appeared not to have learnt
any lessons from the First World War, although over the course
of the war appeared to learn from its own failures. The government
learnt to listen to the people, although they still seemed to
be rather over-optimistic about how much posters could achieve.
When the MoI was set up, it appears
to have been regarded as very unimportant by many of those in
a position to influence it, although this seems to have changed
later when attempts were made to recall advertising experts. The
MoI seemed largely to model itself upon First World War experiences,
with little regard for the cultural changes in the intervening
twenty years, partly because there had been no MoI in those years.
After the First World War, the MoI had been disbanded far too
quickly, and it appears that the government intended to repeat
this mistake as ministers, including Bracken, did not seem to
appreciate the range of roles that the MoI could encompass.
It remains difficult to generalise
about government posters as a large number were produced. For
instance, initially, the MoI appeared to rely largely upon dull
and wordy First World War examples, but soon seemed to realise
that these were not appropriate for the Second World War. However,
one cannot say that the MoI did not produce purely 'word' posters
after the first failures, as it is possible that these simply
did not survive as people did not think them worth saving.
From the start of the war the
MoI had to decide "whether to exhort the population to take the
action desired by the Government or to focus publicity on explaining
and backing up government measures" [Footnote 1]. To begin with,
exhortation was the preferred method, but it was realised that
"exhortations are useless without commands; commands are useless
without organisation" [Footnote 2] and such methods had largely
been abandoned by July 1940 [Footnote 3].
An impression which is echoed
in a contemporary Fougasse cartoon (Figure 63) is
that
In the absence of a smoothly
functioning intelligence division the Ministry adopted the
blunderbuss technique of domestic propaganda, firing as much
material as possible in the hope of hitting something [Footnote
4].
The cartoon, reproduced in a
newspaper article, complained that one could not tell what the
government wished the people to do, as one could not tell the
essential instructions from the peripheral, less urgent, campaigns.
Peace-time department stores usually devoted its entire advertising
to a single sales message, "It did not confuse the issue by including
... exhortations to buy the wares of a dozen different other departments."
[Footnote 5]
M-O suggested that government
campaigns might have been more successful:
|
|
a)
|
if there weren't so many
of them - if you could tell the wood from the trees, the
should from the must;
|
|
|
b)
|
if similar kinds were clearly
and intelligently related to the whole plan;
|
|
|
c)
|
if there was less pleading,
more leading;
|
|
|
d)
|
If the background to needs
and resistances were pre-studied and post-checked more factually
and dealt with on a sounder psychology. [Footnote 6]
|
The war had prompted a "thorough
examination among the nations elites of what constituted British
national identity" [Footnote 7]. It was recognised that new techniques
needed to be adopted to increase the effectiveness of propaganda,
and the government went to considerable expense to set up, and
maintain, the Home Intelligence Division, to discover whether
posters would be effective, and if so, how to target them better.
The government appeared to recognise, if rather belatedly, the
importance of providing accurate information to the people, realising
that if people understood the reasons for restrictions, they were
far more likely to accept them.
Although we have gained an impression
of a government that was out of touch with its people, we have
to bear in mind that the large majority of sources available about
reactions to posters were designed to provide constructive criticism,
and were not really concerned with praising any posters. As such,
we cannot really gain a balanced view on the success of government
posters.
The very fact that so many posters
were needed, aside from the other means by which campaigns were
disseminated, begging people to do various activities, is indicative
of a lack of 'pulling together'. However, we need to note that
the Government did not appear to feel the need to legislate; persuasion
was perceived to be enough. The Emergency Powers Act of 22 May
1944 allowed the government unlimited power over its citizens,
but it appears that they chose not to use such power [Footnote
8]. Although the State had more involvement with the people than
ever before, there was felt a need to be careful as it was claiming
to fight a war on behalf of democracy, against totalitarianism,
and could not appear to be totalitarian.
When planning a post-war campaign,
criticisms were made about the use the government had made of
propaganda in the war:
propaganda can operate efficiently
only as part of a balanced plan ... its real function lies
in speeding up and supporting organised effort, focusing on
a particular target ... It performs the 'softening up' process
without which other action would be less effective [Footnote
9].
It appeared that the government
expected far more from propaganda than propaganda was able to
deliver, and that:
the attempt to use propaganda
as an easy way of avoiding legislation is a waste of energy,
time and money: the role of propaganda more properly being
that of explaining to the public the reason for legislation
and their part in the altered situation [Footnote 10].
Whilst art historians look for
the aesthetic merits in art, the historian looks upon it's historical
merits [Footnote 11] . Posters are culturally relative, they give
us an idea of the problems that the government faced in World
War Two, and how it dealt with them. Posters could be considered
to have exaggerated importance as copies are so easily obtainable,
unlike radio broadcasts, where the general public would have to
go to great lengths to hear one. Posters are regarded as accessible
art by many, but are seen, in art history terms, as poor quality
and therefore undeserved of study. However, poster images can
be seen as a reflection of the government's hopes and fears about
the wartime population, and in this study we have looked behind
the images at these worries. If an image recurred over time, we
could assume that such an image appeared to produced the required
action.
There is much more that could
be done with this subject, including further case studies into
areas such as the use of humour, which has been touched upon,
or the characterisation of inanimate objects such as potatoes
and bombs. It is also conceivable that, through a study of the
surrounding legislation, it would be possible to date further
posters, and to understand to what extent the government relied
solely upon encouragement, or used posters to back up legislation.
Further study into the extent to which posters were used nationally
or locally would also help us to understand whether the government
was in touch with its people. However, within these limitations,
this study has uncovered and analysed a number of key features
of World War II propaganda.
Footnotes:
If you wish to cite from this page, please use
the following citation:
Lewis, R.M., 'Chapter 8, Conclusion, Undergraduate
Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home
front propaganda posters of the Second World War', <http://www.ww2poster.co.uk/research_project/ugrad/dissconclusion.htm>,
written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here
|
Images for, and of, Women
|
|
|
Bibliography and Sources
|
|
